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Abstract. Nowadays interactions with the World Wide Web are ubiquitous. Users
interact through a number of steps consisting of site calls and handling results
that can be automatized as orchestrations. Orchestration results have an inher-
ent degree of uncertainty due to incomplete Web knowledge and orchestration
semantics are characterized in terms of imprecise probabilistic choices. We con-
sider two aspects in this imprecise semantic characterization. First, when local
knowledge (even imprecise) of some part of the Web increases, this knowledge
goes smoothly through the whole orchestration. We deal formally with this aspect
introducing orchestration refinements. Second, we analyze refinement under un-
certainty in the case of parallel composition. Uncertain knowledge is modeled by
an uncertainty profile. Such profiles allow us to look at the uncertainty through a
zero-sum game, called angel/daemon-game, or a/d-game. We propose to use the
structure of the Nash equilibria to refine uncertainty. In this case the information
improves not through cooperation but through the a and d competition.
Keywords. Web, orchestrations, refinement, non-deterministic choice, probabilis-
tic and uncertain reasoning, a/d-games.
1 Introduction
Users interact with the Web through services. In our view an interaction involves a num-
ber of steps, each step consisting of some site or basic service calls and the handling of
the results of the call. Often, this type of interactions can be automatized as orchestra-
tions. In a real scenario where only a partial knowledge on the Web behaviour can be
assumed, orchestration results have some uncertainty degree. The inherent uncertainty
of an orchestration is reflected in the semantic characterization in terms of imprecise
probabilistic choices proposed in [2].
We analyse how a better Web knowledge affects orchestration imprecise seman-
tics. We introduce a partial order [1] on orchestration semantics and we show that, as
expected, a decrease on Web uncertainty is transferred to a better (less imprecise) char-
acterization.
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Delays on delivering site call answers have a crucial role on the orchestration output.
Frequently our knowledge about delays is imprecise. Even having tight bounds on time
delays it is difficult to provide an orchestration assessment. A way to deal with this
problem is to look at the uncertainty through an strategic situation with two antagonistic
players the angel a and the daemon d [3]. The angel a tries to force the best possible
scenario while the daemon d tries to worsen it. This strategic approach provides an
scenario in between the optimistic and the pessimistic ones. We apply this point of
view and we show that it allows to refine orchestration semantics.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce basic concepts con-
cerning orchestrations and Web uncertainty. In particular, we introduce the notion of
knowledge framework to deal with imprecise return times of site calls. In Section 3,
we introduce a partial order on orchestration semantics and we show a refinement re-
sult. In Section 4, we adapt uncertainty profiles and a/d-games to develop the idea of
forget-refinement. In Section 5, we summarize the work and consider some possible
extensions.
2 Web under stress: imprecision
An orchestration is a user-defined program that uses services on the Web. An orchestra-
tor may utilize any service that is available on the Web. Although a concrete language
is not necessary to present the problem under investigation, our results rely in a precise
semantics characterization of the Orc language [13,11]. In particular, Orc will allow
us to develop the interplay between non-determinism and imprecise probabilities in a
mathematical setting. As we will see, the analysis of the Orc expressions strongly guide
the mathematical approach.
In the Orc language services are modelled by sites having predefined semantics A
site is silent if it does not publish any result. A site call publishes at most one response.
An orchestration which composes a number of site calls into a complex computation
can be represented by an Orc expression.
We only deal with orchestrations generating a finite number of results. Two Orc
expressions E and F can be combined using the following operators [13,11]. The
symmetric parallelism E | F : E and F are evaluated in parallel. E | F publishes
some interleaving of the streams published by E and F . The asymmetric parallelism
E(x) < x < F : E and F are evaluated in parallel. Some sub-expressions in E may
become blocked by a dependency on x. The first result published by F is bound to x,
the remainder of F ’s evaluation is terminated and the evaluation of the blocked residue
of E is resumed. Finally, the sequence E > x > F (x): E is evaluated and, for each
value v published by E, an instance F (v) is executed. Given an orchestration E we
denote by sites(E) the set of sites in the definition of E. Information on delays is given
by an evaluation function δ providing the return time of each orchestration site.
Example 1. In MaryNews orchestration sites CNN and BBC 1 are called in parallel
and the result of the first one to answer is emailed to Mary. This procedure can be de-
scribed in Orc as: MaryNews = Mary(x) < x < TwoNews where TwoNews =
1 A call to CNN or BBC can be interpreted as a call to https://edition.cnn.com/ or
https://www.bbc.com/news
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CNN | BBC . Orchestration sites are CNN and BBC in TwoNews and site Mary(x)
providing an email service to Mary. Roughly, the information received by Mary de-
pends on the response times (the delays) of CNN and BBC , denoted as δ(CNN ) and
δ(BBC ). Depending on the delays several cases can arise as we will see in the exam-
ples below. ut
In order to characterize ex-ante the execution of an orchestration E, we introduced
in [5] the meaning or semantics of E, denoted by [[E]]. When there is no information
about return times but we know that orchestration results are m1, . . . ,mk, semantics
[[E]] is given by the multiset bbm1, . . . ,mkcc abstracting away any time order2, and
we write [[E]] = bbm1, . . . ,mkcc. As we will see later, a non-deterministic choice3 of
multisetsMi may be necessary to express the semantics of an orchestration. We write in
this case [[E]] = uiMi. First of all, we consider an example with no information about
delays. When delay time δ is used to analyze semantics of E we write [[E]]δ .
Example 2. Let consider Example 1 under lack of information about delays. Suppose
[[CNN ]] = bbcnncc and [[BBC ]] = bbbbccc. Then [[TwoNews]] = bbcnn, bbccc. Assume
that both delays are unknown, encoded as δ(CNN ) = ⊥ and δ(BBC ) = ⊥. Parame-
ter x in MaryNews = Mary(x) < x < TwoNews will get either cnn or bbc, in fact
the first one to arrive. As we do not have any prior knowledge of the first arrival we as-
sume [[x]]δ = bbcnncc u bbbbccc, i. e. a non-deterministic choice of two small multisets.
Then [[MaryNews]]δ = bbmary cnncc u bbmary bbccc pointing out that Mary gets an
email with news provided by either CNN or BBC . ut
Having full knowledge means that the delay function δ is known and it is defined on
each orchestration site. We take from [9] the notation P QR. It should be read: P
if Q else R.
Example 3. We assume true values δ(CNN ) and δ(BBC ) are known. Under the hy-
pothesis δ(CNN ) 6= δ(BBC ) we have
[[MaryNews]]δ = bbmary cnncc δ(CNN ) < δ(BBC ) bbmary bbccc.
For function δ(CNN ) = 5 and δ(BBC ) = 6, [[x]]δ = bbcnncc and [[MaryNews]]δ =
bbmary cnncc. ut
When (consistent) information increases the imprecision reduces. However, it is impos-
sible to avoid completely the non-determinism.
Example 4. Assume that δ(CNN ) and δ(BBC ) could have the same value, a case that
assuming discrete time is feasible. Here, a race condition give us
[[MaryNews]]δ = bbmary cnncc u bbmary bbccc δ(CNN ) = δ(BBC )
(bbmary cnncc δ(CNN ) < δ(BBC ) bbmary bbccc). ut
2 Notations are taken from [12].
3 We take from [10] the non-determinism P uQ (called daemonic choice).
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When a site S is under stress, information about delay is uncertain. Uncertainty refers
here to response time, as a natural feature of network searches. As opposed to risk, we
assume lack of data on distributions. To deal with this lack of probabilistic information,
we adopt here a two antagonistic approach. When site S is overloaded, the stress can
be exerted by the angel a or the daemon d or both. We denote by δa(S), δd(S) the
corresponding level of stress. We assume that δd(S) ≥ 0, δa(S) ≤ 0. We denote by
Sd site S under daemonic stress, in such a case δ(Sd) = δ(S) + δd(S). Similarly,
Sa denotes S under angelic stress; here delay decreases to δ(Sa) = δ(S) + δa(S). It
could happen that S is under the joint action of a and d denoted as Sa,d and δ(Sa,d) =
δ(S) + δa(S) + δd(S).
Definition 1. A knowledge framework is a tupleK = 〈E, δ, δa, δd〉 where δ is the delay
function and δa and δd provide the delay bounds under stress. Let (a, d) ⊆ sites(E)×
sites(E) be a pair of site subsets under respectively a stress (subset a) and d stress
(subset d). We evaluate S[a, d], under risk conditions, as follows.
S[a, d] =

S if S /∈ a ∪ d
Sa if S ∈ a \ d
Sd if S ∈ d \ a
Sa,d if S ∈ a ∩ d
We denote E[a, d] the orchestration under stress where each S ∈ sites(E) has been
replaced by S[a, d].
When we want to emphasizeK, we write SK[a, d] andEK[a, d]. The delay cost function
D(EK[a, d]) is the delay of the first return based on δ(SK[a, d]). Next example borrows
many ideas from a typical fuzzy approach.
Example 5. Consider the following knowledge framework K for MaryNews .
δ δa δd δ δa δd
CNN 5 −2 3 BBC 6 −4 2
Take (a, d) = ({CNN ,BBC}, {}). Then TwoNewsK[a, d] = (CNN a | BBC a) and
MaryNewsK[a, d] = Mary(x) < x < TwoNewsK[a, d]. ThenD(TwoNewsK[a, d]) =
min{5−2, 6−4} = 2. As BBC a returns before than CNN a the result of the orchestra-
tion is [[MaryNewsK[a, d]]] = bbmary bbccc. Other results are also possible depending
on (a, d), for instance [[MaryNewsK[{CNN }, {}]]] = bbmary cnncc. ut
3 Imprecise probability and refinement
A semantics for orchestrations where non-determinism is modeled with imprecise prob-
abilities was proposed in [2]. We adapt this approach to deal with delays. Let ∆k =
{(p1, . . . , pk) | ∀i : pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1} be a k probabilistic space with k − 1
degrees of freedom.
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Example 6. Let us revisit Example 2 where δ(CNN ) = δ(BBC ) = ⊥. We encode
[[x]]δ = bbcnncc u bbbbccc through imprecise probabilities, ip for short, into
[[x]]ip = bbcnncc@µ1 [] bbbbccc@µ2.
for some indefinite probability vector (µ1, µ2) in ∆2. Last expressions show that se-
mantics of parameter x is the result of a probabilistic choice between two multisets
with imprecise weights µ1 and µ2. Therefore,
[[MaryNews]]ip = bbmary cnncc@µ1 [] bbmary bbccc@µ2.
In the case we need to emphasize the set structure in the probabilistic choices we write
[[x]]ip = {bbcnncc@µ1 [] bbbbccc@µ2 | (µ1, µ2) ∈ ∆2}
= {bbcnncc@µ1 [] bbbbccc@µ2 | µ1, µ2 ≥ 0 and µ1 + µ2 = 1}.
Therefore, [[MaryNews]]ip is represented by
{bbmary cnncc@µ1 [] bbmary bbccc@µ2 | µ1, µ2 ≥ 0 and µ1 + µ2 = 1}. ut
We adapt from Theorem 3 in [2] the definition of multiset probabilistic choice to our
setting. Given ` multisets M1, . . . ,M` and a Cartesian product of probability spaces
∆ = ∆m1 × · · · × ∆mk , we introduce the imprecise probabilistic choice of multisets
M = [] 1≤i≤`Mi@Pi(µ) where multisetMi is chosen with probability Pi(µ); here µ is
any element of ∆ and Pi’s are arithmetic expressions on µ adding up one. Imprecision
comes from the fact that value of µ is indefinite. In set notation




We isolate the different probabilities arising at M as
prbs(M) = {(P1(µ), . . . , P`(µ)) | µ ∈ ∆}.
We consider some examples.
Example 7. From Example 3, we have [[x]]δ = bbcnncc = (bbcnncc@1 [] bbbbccc@0).
Therefore P1 = 1, P2 = 0 and then prbs([[x]]δ) = {(1, 0)}. From Example 6, we
have prbs([[x]]ip) = {(µ1, µ2) | µ1 + µ2 = 1} ⊆ [0, 1] × [0, 1]. Also we have that
prbs([[MaryNews]]ip) = prbs([[x]]ip). Now, consider another possible meaning (see
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| µ1 + µ2 = 1}.
Note that prbs([[x]]rf) ⊆ [0.32, 0.4]× [0.4, 0.6]. Also
[[MaryNews]]rf = bbmary cnncc@P1(µ) [] bbmary bbccc@P2(µ)
and prbs([[MaryNews]]rf) = prbs([[x]]rf). ut
In order to compare [[x]]ip and [[x]]rf, we introduce refinements in the case of multi-
set probabilistic choice. This needs some careful considerations. For probability distri-
butions, standard deviation is mostly accepted as a measure of being “more precise”.
Following [8], we consider a different approach.
Given `multisets (M1, . . . ,M`) and a Cartesian product of probability spaces∆we
would like to compare probabilistic multisets over theMi and∆. Given (F1(µ), . . . F`(µ))




j Gj(µ) = 1, consider
the probabilistic multisets
M = { [] 1≤i≤`Mi@Fi(µ) | µ ∈ ∆}, M
′ = { [] 1≤j≤`Mj@Gj(µ
′) | µ′ ∈ ∆}.
The set of probability distributions are,
prbs(M) = {(F1(µ), . . . F`(µ)) | µ ∈ ∆}
prbs(M ′) = {(G1(µ′), . . . G`(µ′)) | µ′ ∈ ∆}
We say that M is more imprecise than M ′ (or M ′ is more precise than M ), denoted as
M v M ′ if probabilities in M ′ are less spread than in M , formally iff prbs(M ′) ⊆
prbs(M). This approach makes sense because,
– any choice in M ′ is also a choice in M ,
– moreover, both choices appear with the same probability distribution.
As in M ′ there are less possible choices than in M , uncertainty increases from M ′
to M . In this framework, increasing the imprecision means increasing the number of
probabilistic choices. We summarize this point of view in the following definition.
Definition 2. Given ` multisets M1, . . . ,M` and two multiset choices with imprecise
weights M = [] 1≤i≤`Mi@Fi(µ) and M
′ = [] 1≤i≤`Mi@Gi(µ
′) for, respectively,
indefinite elements µ and µ′ in ∆. We say that M is more imprecise than M ′ (or M ′ is
more precise than M ), denoted as M vM ′ iff prbs(M ′) ⊆ prbs(M).
Example 8. Let us continue with Example 7. As prbs([[x]]δ) ⊆ prbs([[x]]ip), accord-
ing to Definition 2, we have [[x]]ip v [[x]]δ . As prbs([[x]]rf) ⊆ prbs([[x]]ip), we have
[[x]]ip v [[x]]rf. Observe that [[x]]rf and [[x]]δ are not comparable, as prbs([[x]]δ) 6⊆
prbs([[x]]rf) and prbs([[x]]rf) 6⊆ prbs([[x]]δ). ut
Theorem 1. Let F be a sub-orchestration of E = E(F ). Suppose that our knowl-
edge [[F ]] improves into [[F ′]], i.e., [[F ]] v [[F ′]]. Then, the increase of knowledge goes
smoothly through the whole orchestration; [[E(F )]] v [[E(F ′)]].




{CNN } 6 3
{BBC} 2 4 a
d
{CNN } {BBC}
{CNN } CNN a,d u BBC CNN a
{BBC} BBC a BBC a,d
Fig. 1. Take U = 〈K, sites(TwoNews), sites(TwoNews), 1, 1,∆(EK[a, d])〉. The left table
corresponds to Γ (U) and the right table to the values of the indicator function.
Proof (Sketch). We proceed by structural induction showing that refinement is mono-
tone through Orc operators. As an illustration, let us consider the parallel composition
case. Take E = F | G where
[[F ]] = [] 1≤i≤`Mi@Pi(µ), [[G]] = [] 1≤j≤mNj@Qj(γ),
for imprecise µ and γ in∆. According to [2], [[F | G]] = [] i,j(Mi+Nj)@(Pi(µ)Qj(γ)).
We write prbs(F | G) when ` = m = 2,
{(P1(µ)Q1(γ), P1(µ)Q2(γ), F2(µ)G1(γ), F2(µ)G2(γ)) | µ, γ ∈ ∆}.
Suppose [[G]] v [[H]] with [[H]] = [] 1≤j≤mNj@Rj(τ) for imprecise τ in ∆, so
prbs([[H]]) ⊆ prbs([[G]]). For m = 2 this inclusion can be written as,
{(R1(τ), R2(τ) | τ ∈ ∆} ⊆ {(Q1(γ), Q2(γ) | γ ∈ ∆}.
For each value Pi(µ), it holds that {(Pi(µ)R1(τ), Pi(µ)R2(τ) | τ ∈ ∆} is contained
into {(Pi(µ)Q1(γ), Pi(µ)G2(γ) | γ ∈ ∆}. Therefore prbs([[F | H]]) ⊆ prbs([[F |
G]]) and [[F | G]] v [[F | H]] holds. With the definitions given in [2], we prove similar
results for the asymmetric parallelism and sequence operators. ut
Example 9. From Example 7, we get prbs([[MaryNews]]ip) = prbs([[x]]ip) and also
prbs([[MaryNews]]rf) = prbs([[x]]rf). Therefore [[x]]ip v [[x]]rf translates directly
into [[MaryNews]]ip v [[MaryNews]]rf. ut
4 Uncertainty profiles and refinement
Stressed orchestrations can deliver different results depending on the location of the
stress, see for instance Example 5 above. If we bound the spread of the stress but it is
not possible to locate it, what can be said about the delay? To give an answer to this
question we adapt uncertainty profiles to this framework [3].
A uncertainty profile U takes a closer look to a knowledge profileK = 〈E, δ, δa, δd〉
providing bounds to the spread and intensity of the stress. The stress effects are mea-
sured through a cost (or utility) function. Formally U = 〈K,A,D, ba, bd,D(EK[a, d])〉
where agents (or players) a and d have the capability to act on subsets of sites A and D
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of the orchestration E from K. Parameters ba and bd give the number of sites that a or
d can stress. The effects of the joint interaction of a and d is measured by D(EK[a, d]).
As in [3], we associate to U a zero-sum a/d-game Γ (U) = 〈Aa, Ad,D(EK[a, d])〉
with two antagonistic players the angel a and the daemon d. The actions of a and d
are given by the sets Aa = {a ⊆ A | #a = ba} and Ad = {d ⊆ D | #d = bd}.
The delay D(EK[a, d]) becomes a cost function. Angel a tries to minimize the delay
and d to maximize it. The set of strategy profiles is Aa × Ad. Choices for a and d can
be defined probabilistically. Mixed strategies for a and d are probability distributions
α : Aa → [0, 1] and β : Ad → [0, 1] respectively. Delay of the mixed strategy (α, β) is
D(EK[α, β]) =
∑
(a,d)∈Aa×Ad α(a)D(EK[a, d])β(d). Let ∆a and ∆d denote the set
of mixed strategies for a and d, respectively. A pure strategy profile (a, d) is a special
case of mixed strategy (α, β) in which α(a) = 1 and β(d) = 1. A mixed strategy profile
(α, β) is a Nash equilibrium if, for any α′ ∈ ∆a, it holdsD(EK[α, β]) ≤ D(EK[α′, β])
(a tries to minimize the delay as possible; going out of the Nash cannot reduce delay)
and, for any β′ ∈ ∆d, it holds D(EK[α, β]) ≥ D(EK[α, β′]) (d tries to maximize the
delay; going out of the Nash cannot increase delay). A pure Nash equilibrium, PNE, is
a Nash equilibrium (a, d) with pure strategies.
It holds that all Nash equilibrium (pure and mixed) of a zero-sum game Γ have the
same value ν(Γ ) corresponding to the cost of the row player [14]. For an a/d game
Γ (U) we have:









This observation is important because it allows us to associate a delay to an uncertain
situation looking at it as a zero-sum game. We take this value as the result of the strategic
approach to uncertainty.
Definition 3. The delay associated to U is D(U) = ν(Γ (U)).
When (α, β) is a Nash equilibrium it holds D(U) = D(EK[α, β]).
Example 10. We consider for orchestration TwoNews = CNN | BBC the knowledge
profile K in Example 5. We examine the uncertainty profile U defined as
〈K, sites(TwoNews), sites(TwoNews), 1, 1,D(EK[a, d])〉,
where both sites can be stressed but the angel (respectively, the daemon) affects only to
one site. Along this example we shorten D(EK[a, d]) as D(a, d). Actions of a in Γ (U)
are given by Aa = {a ⊆ sites(TwoNews) | #a = 1} = {{CNN }, {BBC}}. As
Ad = Aa, the set of strategy profiles Aa ×Ad is
{({CNN }, {CNN }), ({CNN }, {BBC}), ({BBC}, {CNN }), ({BBC}, {BBC})}.
It holds
D({CNN }, {CNN }) = min{δ(CNN ) + δa(CNN ) + δd(CNN ), δ(BBC )} = 6.
Other cases are computed similarly. The a/d-game is shown on the left table in the
Fig.1. A strategy giving the Nash equilibrium for a, α = (α({CNN }), α({BBC})),
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can be found solving the equation D(α, {CNN }) = D(α, {BBC}). Similarly, to
get β for d we solve D({CNN }, β) = D({BBC}, β). Then α = (2/5, 3/5) and

























We are interested in modelling how the a/d-games are able to refine the imprecise
knowledge on asymmetric parallelism. Consider E(x) < x < F where F is a parallel
composition of sites S1 | · · · | Sk. Assume [[Si]] = bbsicc, then [[F ]] = bbs1, . . . , skcc,
and, with no delay time information (δ = ⊥), we can only infer that parameter x will
hold any of the values in [[F ]]. So, [[x]] = bbs1ccu· · ·ubbskcc. The imprecise probabilistic
model gives
[[x]]ip = bbs1cc@µ1 [] · · · [] bbskcc@µk,
for an indefinite probability vector (µ1, . . . , µk) in ∆k, and so
[[E(x) < x < F ]]ip = [] 1≤i≤k[[E(si)]]@µi.
In order to provide an expression for the refinement of [[x]]ip through a/d-games, we
introduce some additional concepts.
Definition 4. Let U = 〈K,A,D, ba, bd,D(EK[a, d])〉, where K = 〈F, δ, δa, δd〉 and
F is a parallel composition of sites S1 | · · · | Sk. For each strategy profile (a, d) we
consider F [a, d] = T1 | · · · | Tk where T` = S`[a, d], for 1 ≤ ` ≤ k. The indicator
function of strategy profile (a, d) in Γ (U) is the set consisting of all S` sites such that
δ(T`) is minimum among {δ(T1), . . . , δ(Tk)}. Formally,
IU (a, d) = {S` | δ(T`) = D(F [a, d])}.






Proof. By definition, D(U) =
∑
a,d α(a)D(F [a, d])β(d). As S ∈ IU (a, d), it holds
δ(S[a, d]) = D(F [a, d]) and we get the result. ut
Let us introduce refinements [[x]]U , provided by Γ (U) game , on the [[x]]ip semantics.
Example 11. We continue with the Example 10 emphasizing the stress suffered by the
sites, see the right table in Fig. 1. This table points out the sites giving minimum re-
turn time in (CNN | BBC )[a, d]. For instance, when (a, d) = ({CNN }, {CNN }),
the table value is a non-deterministic choice between CNN a,d and BBC representing
that IU (CNN ,CNN ) is {CNN ,BBC}. The following refinement of [[x]]ip can be in-
troduced from a Nash equlibrium and the indicators functions of Γ (U). First consider a
version where the a/d stress over the sites is explicitly added when needed to improve
readability,
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Note that in this case D(U) is 18/5. ut
The formal definition of the U refinements that fixes stress exerted by a and d over the
sites according to weigthed strategy profiles in Γ (U) in a Nash equilibrium is as follows
Definition 5. The U refinements of [[x]]ip is given by
[[x]]U = [] a,d(uS∈IU (a,d)[[S]])@α(a)× β(d),
where (α, β) is a Nash equilibrium of Γ (U).
Example 12. For the Nash equilibrium in Example 10, the U refinement for [[x]]ip is






































































where probability vector (µ1, µ2) is indefinite. Then, we have the following meaning
















As [[x]]ip is described by any probability distribution, prbs([[x]]U ) ⊆ prbs([[x]]ip).
Moreover, if we assume that the environment behaves as predicted by U , a more precise
behaviour can be announced.
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Theorem 2. Given E(x) < x < F where F = (S1 | · · · | Sk) and an uncertainty
profile U on F we have [[x]]ip v [[x]]U and [[E(x) < x < F ]]ip v [[E(x) < x < F ]]U .
Assuming that F behaves as predicted by Γ (U), the arrival times to x of the different
possible values follow the [[x]]U distribution. Moreover, assuming that the execution of
E is triggered by x, E(D(E(x) < x < F )) = D(E) +D(U).
In this way, using induction and additional rules for more complex composition, we can
associate a meaning to any E under uncertainty profile U , [[E]]U which is a refinement
on [[E]]ip .
5 Conclusions
Although cooperation is the usual model to improve situations, in real scenarios it is
more likely to find some sort of competition. We have shown a way to use the com-
petition between agents, a and d, to improve our knowledge of the environment. Our
approach allows to consider more realistic scenarios and provides an additional analy-
sis tool to support the decisions of the system managers. Here, we have continued the
work in [2] considering the relation between imprecise probability semantics and the
a/d-approach. In particular, we have shown that the structure of Nash equilibria due to
a/d-games can be used to refine the imprecise meaning of E(x) < x < F which is
the unique composition rule that inserts additional non-determinism in the behaviour
of an orchestration. Our results also show a monotonic behaviour of imprecise mean-
ing versus the level of knowledge. We are working towards understanding better the
framework, in particular, monotonicity properties with respect to different uncertainty
profiles in general orchestrations.
Nash equilibria and the value of the a/d-game is a natural solution for refinement,
however finding Nash equilibria in a/d-games can be computationally difficult, in fact
it is an EXP-complete problem [4]. As a/d-games are zero-sum games, it might also
be possible to find the game values through iterative methods [16]. Furthermore, the
approach through mixed strategies, appearing in the Nash equilibria, seems also to sug-
gest the possibility to develop algorithms based Monte Carlo techniques, that could be
more efficient. It will be of interest to explore these approaches.
It will also be of interest to analyse whether the a/d-refinement applies to other set-
tings in particular to short-term economic systems like the IS-LM or IS-MP models [6]
or other decision support models. Finally it could be interesting to apply this approach
to more applied problems like real politics [7] or climate change [15].
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